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WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE-THE FIRST
CIRCUIT FURTHER CONFUSES AN
EXISTING CIRCUIT SPLIT IN UNITED
STATES V. TEXTRON INC.
Sarah Seifert Mallett*
IN United States v. Textron Inc., the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit held that the work-product doctrine does not protect tax ac-
crual work papers prepared by lawyers from an IRS summons con-
nected with an investigation of a taxpayer's tax liability.' The First
Circuit's decision incorrectly applied the precedent established in Maine
v. U.S. Department of the Interior,2 misinterpreted the text and policy of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), and overlooked the widespread
consequences of further fragmenting an already divided interpretation of
the phrase "in anticipation of litigation."
In preparing public financial statements, Textron, an "aerospace and
defense conglomerate, with well over a hundred subsidiaries," calculates
reserves to account for contingent tax liabilities, which include estimates
of potential liability if the IRS challenges the positions in its tax returns.3
The work papers used in this process include spreadsheets, emails, and
notes that reflect items in the tax return that could result in additional
taxes, the dollar amount subject to dispute, and a percentage estimate of
the IRS's chance of success in possible litigation.4 In 2003, the IRS con-
ducted an audit of Textron's corporate income tax liability for the years
1998-2001.5 After examining the 2001 returns, the IRS believed that Tex-
tron Financial Corporation, a Textron subsidiary, engaged in sale-in,
lease-out transactions, which the IRS lists as a potential tax shelter sub-
ject to abuse by taxpayers. 6
Textron refused to comply with an administrative summons issued by
the IRS seeking all the work papers generated for the 2001 tax year and
* J.D. Candidate 2011, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law;
B.B.A. 2006, the University of Texas at Austin. The author would like to thank her hus-
band and family for their love and support.
1. 577 F.3d 21, 31-32 (1st Cir. 2009) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, 78 U.S.L.W.
3375 (U.S. Dec. 24, 2009) (No. 09-750).
2. 298 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2002).
3. Textron, 577 F.3d at 22-23.
4. Id. at 23.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 23-24.
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related work papers created by Ernst & Young, Textron's outside ac-
countant.7 The contents of these work papers included disputable tax
items and amounts, percentage estimates of a successful challenge by the
IRS, and applicable reserve amounts.8 The IRS then brought an enforce-
ment action in federal district court in Rhode Island.9 In defense, Tex-
tron asserted that the summons lacked a legitimate purpose, that the
attorney-client and tax practitioner privileges applied, and that the pa-
pers were protected under the work-product doctrine.10 The district
court agreed with Textron's position that the work-product doctrine pro-
tected the work papers and found they were prepared "because of"" the
prospect of litigation and, consequently, the court denied the IRS's peti-
tion for enforcement. 12 The district judge noted that although work-
product privilege does not apply to documents created within the ordi-
nary course of business irrespective of litigation, the work papers, which
contained dubious items identified by attorneys and accountants, esti-
mated probabilities of litigation outcomes, and calculations of tax
reserves would not have been prepared "but for" the anticipated possibil-
ity of litigation.' 3 Textron witnesses testified during trial that tax reserve
calculations would not have been necessary without the possibility of liti-
gation; therefore, the purpose behind generating the work papers was to
ensure Textron was adequately prepared for future litigation.14
On appeal, a divided panel upheld the district court's decision, but the
court later granted the IRS's petition for rehearing en banc and vacated
the panel decision.15 The First Circuit initially looked to the origins of
the work-product privilege in the Supreme Court's decision in Hickman
v. Taylor and the later codification in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(3) for guidance on the triggering language and intent behind the
protection of documents.16 Focusing on the protection for tax work pa-
pers specifically, the First Circuit discussed rulings from the only two cir-
cuits that have addressed the issue-its own ruling in Maine v. U.S.
Department of the Interior and the Fifth Circuit's ruling in United States v.
El Paso Co.17 Relying primarily on its direct precedent in Maine, histori-
7. Id. at 24.
8. Id. at 24-25. In some instances, the probability of IRS success was estimated at
100%. Id. at 25.
9. Id. at 24.
10. Id. Evidence showed that Textron's tax department attorneys were centrally in-
volved with the preparation and generation of the work papers in question, and outside
counsel advised Textron on tax reserve requirements. Id.
11. The district court followed the "because of" test adopted by the First Circuit in
Maine v. Department of the Interior, 298 F.3d 60, 68 (1st Cir. 2002). United States v. Tex-
tron Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 149-50 (D.R.I. 2007).
12. Textron, 577 F.3d at 25-26.
13. Id. at 25-26; Textron, 507 F. Supp. 2d at 150.
14. Textron, 577 F.3d at 28.
15. Id. at 26.
16. Id. at 26-27 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-
11 (1947)).
17. Id. at 30 (citing Maine v. Dep't of the Interior, 298 F.3d 60, 70 (1st Cir. 2002);
United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 543-44 (5th Cir. 1982)).
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cal context of the work-product doctrine, and underlying prudential con-
cerns, the court reasoned that the work-product doctrine is aimed at
protecting work prepared for and used in litigation and that IRS access to
Textron's work papers is essential to the public interest.18
The court determined that the text of Rule 26(b)(3), Supreme Court
doctrine, direct precedent in Maine, and public policy judgments applied
together answer the legal questions involving work-product protection of
tax accrual work papers.19 In referencing these sources, the court's deci-
sion turned on its interpretation of the key language in the codified
rule-"prepared in anticipation of litigation"-which it determined
meant "prepared for use in" litigation.20
First, the court noted that the phrase "prepared in anticipation of litiga-
tion" as used in Rule 26(b)(3) is illustrative of Hickman's reasoning and
should be the key language applied to the present case.21 In dissecting
this language, the court emphasized that historical English privilege
guided Hickman and the development of Rule 26(b)(3). 22 The court
found that, historically, the focus of work-product protection has been on
materials prepared for use in litigation and that the English privilege in-
voked by Hickman protects documents that assist in litigation.23 'Ihe
court also relied in part on English precedent to argue that the decisive
phrase used in Rule 26(b)(3)-"prepared in anticipation of litigation or
for trial"-refers only to material prepared for and with the purpose of
assisting in litigation.24 The court reasoned that Textron's primary and
only purpose in preparing the tax accrual work papers was to establish
reserves for its financial statements and not for use in possible litigation;
thus, the papers were not entitled to work-product protection.25 To bol-
ster this finding, the court relied on the theory that "any experienced liti-
gator" would concede that tax accrual work papers are not case
preparation material. 26
Turning next to direct precedent, the First Circuit indicated that Maine
"straightforwardly" explained that Textron's tax accrual work papers
were not entitled to protection because they were "'documents that are
prepared in the ordinary course of business or would have been created
in essentially similar form irrespective of the litigation. " 2 7 The court also
drew a parallel with the Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v. El Paso
Co., which denied protection for work papers based on a "primary pur-
pose" test, by highlighting that the work papers' "sole function" in El
Paso was to support financial statements and finding that this, too, was
18. Id. at 30-32.
19. Id. at 28.
20. Id. at 29-32.
21. Id. at 27.
22. Id. at 29 (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 n.9 (1947)).
23. Id. at 29-30; see Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510-11.
24. Textron, 577 F.3d at 29.
25. Id. at 27.
26. Id. at 28.
27. Id. at 30 (quoting Maine v. Dep't of the Interior, 298 F.3d 60, 70 (1st Cir. 2002)).
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the only purpose of Textron's papers.28 Finally, relying heavily on pru-
dential concerns, the First Circuit supported granting the IRS's summons
because of the important function of detecting and disallowing abusive
tax shelters, the threat involved in underpaying taxes, and the public in-
terest in collecting revenue. 29 The First Circuit stated that "tax collection
is not a game" and suggested that the practical problems confronting the
IRS in discovering tax reporting errors outweighed any unfairness to
Textron.30
In dissent, Judges Torruella and Lipez protested that the majority's de-
cision blatantly ignored and abandoned Maine's "because of" test and
formulated a new "prepared for use in" test that is contrary to Maine,
United States v. Adlman, which first articulated the "because of" test, and
the text and policy of Rule 26(b)(3). 31 Referencing AdIman, which the
Maine court followed, the dissent argued that the intentional inclusion of
the phrase "in anticipation of" in the text of Rule 26(b)(3) sweeps
broadly and does not limit work-product protection to documents pre-
pared to aid in, use in, or assist in litigation.32 The dissent also criticized
the majority's policy analysis because it focused on the IRS's arduous and
important task of revenue collection, but it ignored that the information
accompanying the work papers would enable the IRS to identify the ex-
act amount Textron would be willing to spend in litigation on each dis-
puted item. 3 3 This, according to the dissent, was contrary to the
underlying policy of the work-product doctrine stated in Hickman, which,
as explained in Adiman, protects the attorney's litigation strategies, ap-
praisal of likely success, and feasibility of settlement.34 The dissent con-
cluded that not only did the majority err in its interpretation, analysis,
and application of the law, but under the "because of" test, the proper
conclusion is that Textron's work papers are protected by the work-prod-
uct doctrine. 35
The First Circuit's decision in Textron misuses the court's decision in
Maine and misinterprets the language and intent of Rule 26(b)(3). The
majority misconstrues language from Hickman, Maine, and Rule 26(b)(3)
to develop a new "prepared for use in litigation" test while departing
from the inherent purpose and broad scope of the precedential "because
of" test. Moreover, the opinion offers biased public policy arguments to
support the IRS's position without addressing the underlying intent and
policy of the work-product privilege doctrine. Furthermore, the First Cir-
28. Id. (quoting United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 543-44 (5th Cir. 1982)).
29. Id. at 31-32.
30. Id. at 31.
31. Id. at 32 (Torruella, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194,
1202 (2d Cir. 1998)).
32. Id. at 34 (citing Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1198-99).
33. Id. at 36-37.
34. Id. at 36 (citing Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1200); see also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S.
495, 510-11(1947) (stating that it is essential that a lawyer be free to prepare his legal
theories and strategies without undue interference).
35. Textron, 577 F.3d at 32, 38.
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cuit disregards the future consequences of this ruling, its impact on a vari-
ety of practices and lawyers, and the additional split it has created in the
interpretation of a well-established and important evidentiary doctrine.
As the dissent correctly points out, the majority's fatal flaw is in its
reasoning and its deceptive reliance on the Maine opinion and the text of
Rule 26(b)(3) in concluding that the tax accrual work papers are not enti-
tled to work-product protection.3 6 Maine rejected the "primary purpose"
test, which stated that dual-purpose documents must be "prepared prima-
rily for litigation purposes" to be entitled to work-product protection.37
Instead, the First Circuit in Maine relied on the Second Circuit's rationale
in Adlman and adopted the "because of" test for determining work-prod-
uct protection for dual-purpose documents because it is a broader
formula and is more consistent with the text and purpose of Rule
26(b)(3).38 In Textron, the majority failed to even acknowledge Maine's
adoption of the "because of" test or the purpose behind endorsing it and,
instead, highlighted a more discrete finding: that there is no work-product
protection for "documents that are prepared in the ordinary course of
business or . . . created in essentially similar form irrespective of the liti-
gation."39 Then the court deceivingly stated that Maine "applies straight-
forwardly" because the work papers were prepared in the "ordinary
course of business," disregarding the essential "because of" test and the
critical district court evidence attesting that the work papers were only
prepared because of possible litigation and would not have been prepared
but for litigation.40 In bypassing the "because of" test, the court subtly
adopted a use-related test, which is comparable to the Fifth Circuit's "pri-
mary purpose" test specifically repudiated by the First Circuit.41 The
First Circuit held that the tax accrual work papers were not afforded pro-
tection because their "only purpose" was to prepare financial statements
and there was no evidence that the papers were "prepared for use in" or
served a useful purpose in conducting litigation. 42 To discredit district
court testimony and enforce this novel "use" standard, the court boldly
purported that "every lawyer" knows the "touch and feel" of documents
used in preparation for a lawsuit and that "any experienced litigator"
would know the work papers were not for use as case preparation.43 The
most troubling aspect of the majority's reasoning-aside from the fact
that Maine does not reference any use-related test-is that it plainly con-
36. See id. at 32-34.
37. Maine v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 298 F.3d 60, 66-68 (1st Cir. 2002).
38. Id. at 68 (citing AdIman, 134 F.3d at 1197-99) (holding that the policies underlying
the work-product doctrine suggest that protection should not be denied to a dual-purpose
document that "analyzes expected litigation merely because it is prepared to assist in a
business decision").
39. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 30 (majority opinion) (quoting Maine, 298 F.3d at 70)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
40. See id.; United States v. Textron Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 150 (D.R.I. 2007).
41. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 26-30.
42. Id. at 30.
43. See id. at 28-30.
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flicts with Maine, which explicitly comports with the AdIman decision
that documents are protected if they have been prepared "because of the
prospect of litigation" and not because they might "assist in" or be used
in litigation.4 4
Furthermore, the majority's reliance on the English roots of the work-
product doctrine seems archaic, and its resulting interpretation of the lan-
guage and intent in Rule 26(b)(3) is distorted. The majority cites English
privilege referenced in Hickman to argue that documents must serve the
purpose of assisting in any actual or anticipated litigation to be afforded
work-product protection. 4 5 Nearly twenty-five years after Hickman and
decades later than the earliest English privilege, however, the work-prod-
uct doctrine was codified in Rule 26(b)(3) with the intent to preserve the
privacy of an attorney's work, a concern essential to adversarial legal pro-
cess. 4 6 Rule 26(b)(3) contains the intentional phrase "in anticipation of
litigation," which sweeps broadly to uphold the policies and principles
behind its codification and is alone sufficient to afford Textron's work
papers protection.4 7 The text of Rule 26(b)(3) does not limit its scope of
protection to documents prepared strictly for use in or to assist in litiga-
tion.48 To hold otherwise would jeopardize a lawyer's ability to "prepare
his legal theories and plan his strategy," 4 9 which the dissent correctly
points out is at stake in this case because of the explicit litigation strate-
gies and statistics listed in the work papers.50
The problems inherent in the court's interpretation of Rule 26(b)(3)
and its reliance (or lack thereof) on Maine pale in comparison to the
sweeping consequences that this case has for tax litigation, discovery dis-
putes, and corporate attorneys. The First Circuit's new "prepared for use
in litigation" test further compounds the issues created by the existing
circuit split regarding the interpretation of "in anticipation of litigation"
through the use of the "primary purpose" test or the "because of" test.
The dissent accurately stated that in "straining to craft a rule favorable to
the IRS ... the majority has thrown the law of work-product protection
into disarray."51 The First Circuit's narrow reading of the work-product
doctrine will likely have implications beyond tax accrual work papers.
Dual-purpose documents are increasingly relied on not only in tax but in
many other types of litigation. Under Textron, corporations may now
44. See Maine, 298 F.3d at 68 (citing United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1197-98
(2d Cir. 1998)).
45. Textron, 577 F.3d at 29 (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 n.9 (1947)).
46. See Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1198-99; FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee's
notes.
47. See Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1198-99.
48. Id. at 1198.
49. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511.
50. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 36 (Torruella, J., dissenting); see also United States v.
Textron Inc., F. Supp. 2d 138, 142-43 (detailing the "hazards of litigation percentages" in-
cluded in Textron's work papers).
51. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 43.
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hesitate to record any financial liability on the books for fear that it will
be discoverable.
The problem with the First Circuit's opinion in United States v. Textron
Inc. is not in its holding, but rather its flawed, incomplete, and misguided
reasoning. The majority should have acknowledged the "because of" test
embraced in Maine instead of adopting a new use-related test. Then the
court should have applied the "because of" test to the facts and testimony
of the case rather than relying on what "experienced lawyers" know and
do.52 Moreover, the court mistakenly relied on antiquated English privi-
lege and misinterpreted the intent and text of Hickman and Rule
26(b)(3). The court offered an unbalanced policy argument that solely
supported the IRS's position and overlooked the purpose of the work-
product doctrine and its foundation in our legal system. If allowed to
stand, this ruling will further fragment the issue of work-product protec-
tion for dual-purpose documents in an already divided area of law.
52. See id. at 28-30 (majority opinion).
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